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PEOPLE@HES-SO – Annuaire et Répertoire des compétences
PEOPLE@HES-SO – Annuaire et Répertoire des compétences

PEOPLE@HES-SO
Annuaire et Répertoire des compétences

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Duc Alexandre

Duc Alexandre

Professeur HES associé

Compétences principales

Cryptographie

Sécurité informatique

Post-quantum Cryptography

Cybersecurity

Cybersécurité

Sécurité de l'information

Sécurité logicielle

Applied Cryptography

Réalisations phares

Recherche
DiCoQuaNet
Conférences
SCOUT-CT: Sound Constant-Time Outcome with Uncertainty Tracking using multi-taint analysis
Publications
Making masking security proofs concrete (or how to evaluate the security of any leaking device), extended version
  • Contact

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  • Conférences

Contrat principal

Professeur HES associé

Téléphone: +41 24 557 64 30

Bureau: B35

Haute Ecole d'Ingénierie et de Gestion du Canton de Vaud
Route de Cheseaux 1, 1400 Yverdon-les-Bains, CH
HEIG-VD
MSc HES-SO en Engineering - HES-SO Master
  • Cryptographie
  • Cryptographie appliquée
BSc HES-SO en Télécommunications - Haute Ecole d'Ingénierie et de Gestion du Canton de Vaud
  • Cryptographie
  • Sécurité logicielle
  • Cryptographie appliquée

En cours

Blockchain au service de l'énergie transactionnelle

Rôle: Co-requérant(s)

Financement: HES-SO

Description du projet :

La prolifération de micro-producteurs d'énergie électrique ainsi que la part croissante des énergies renouvelables dans le mix énergétique constituent à la fois une opportunité pour la collectivité et un défi de taille pour les exploitants du réseau. L'infrastructure actuelle fonctionne selon le principe du « copper plate » qui ne met pas de limitations au marché : l'offre est adaptée à la demande. Afin de pouvoir profiter au mieux des possibilités offertes par la fragmentation de la production, il va falloir changer de paradigme ; il s'agit désormais de revoir le modèle d'affaires et les infrastructures techniques pour adapter au mieux la demande à l'offre.
La technologie actuelle permet de mettre en 'uvre des moyens pour valider les micro-transactions entre fournisseurs traditionnels et clients-producteurs dont le nombre croissant est stimulé par la baisse des coûts des technologies de production individuelles.
Le concept de « Transactive Energy » combine les aspects économiques et les techniques de contrôle pour améliorer l'efficience et la fiabilité d'un système de distribution d'énergie [1]. Cette idée s'inscrit dans l'évolution « Smart » qui touche de nombreux aspects du fonctionnement de notre société (Smart Building, Smart City, Smart Transport, Smart Grid, etc.)
La technologie du « Blockchain » permet de garantir l'authenticité de transactions électroniques dans un concept de base de données répartie. Les crypto-monnaies en sont une application actuellement répandue sur Internet [2]. Récemment l'écosystème des crypto-monnaies a été étendu pour inclure la notion de «Smart Contracts» qui amène la possibilité d'assurer l'intégrité des opérations échangées par l'ensemble des acteurs. Cette nouvelle propriété de certains « Blockchains » ouvre des possibilités multiples dans plusieurs domaines industriels. Spécifiquement, son application est très prometteuse pour les transactions monétaires associées à la remise en réseau d'une partie de l'électricité produite localement de façon répartie.
Dans le cadre de ce projet, il s'agit de déterminer si les «Smart Contracts » sont utilisables dans le contexte du « Transactive Energy » et d'en concevoir des cas d'application pouvant être mis en 'uvre dans le concept du « Smart Grid /Micro Grid » et des nouvelles relations contractuelles qui vont en découler.

Equipe de recherche au sein de la HES-SO: Gaillet Patrick , Pavanello Davide , Duc Alexandre

Durée du projet: 02.02.2018 - 30.12.2020

Montant global du projet: 227'000 CHF

Statut: En cours

Terminés

ATLAS

Rôle: Requérant(e) principal(e)

Financement: Armasuisse, CYD campus

Description du projet :

Timing attacks are a class of side-channel attacks in which an adversary infers secret information by measuring how long computations take. Subtle differences in execution time can reveal sensitive values even when the underlying algorithm is otherwise secure.

The impact is particularly acute in cryptography. Practical timing attacks against widely deployed implementations have demonstrated full recovery of secrets such as encryption keys and plaintext messages. As a result, ensuring that security-critical code is timing-robust is a core concern in modern secure software engineering.
Building software that resists timing leakage demands adherence to strict programming practices. Manually auditing code for such properties is time-consuming and error-prone. This motivates automated methods for determining whether a program is vulnerable to timing attacks and, ultimately, for helping developers eliminate these side channels at scale.
A large number of approaches were proposed to automatically determine if a program is vulnerable to timing attacks or not. However, those tools still demand significant human effort:

  •  Complete approaches help to discover timing leaks but cannot certify the absence of such leaks. The positive findings of these tools are actionable, but ”no findings” is not evidence of security. Consequently, the absence of discovered timing leak can not be used as a proof of security.
  • Sound approaches offer the guarantee to discover all timing leaks, but are prone to false alarms, i.e., in addition to real timing leaks, they discover ”leaks” that do not actually exist in real program executions. These approaches can certify absence—if they report no leak, the program is secure—but positive findings are noisy and demand time-consuming manual review.

Eliminating both drawbacks at once would require an analysis that is simultaneously sound and complete,
which is infeasible in practice due to path explosion.
We present a novel static approach that significantly reduces the amount of human work required to certify whether or not a program is secure against timing attacks.

Equipe de recherche au sein de la HES-SO: Duc Alexandre

Durée du projet: 02.01.2024 - 30.11.2025

Publications liées:

  • SCOUT-CT: Sound Constant-Time Outcome with Uncertainty Tracking using multi-taint analysis

Statut: Terminé

DiCoQuaNet

Rôle: Requérant(e) principal(e)

Financement: Innosuisse

Description du projet :

One of the main goals of cryptography is to ensure the confidentiality and authenticity of data in an increasingly digitized world. However, the emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to the security of conventional cryptographic methods. These computers have the potential to solve complex mathematical problems, upon which much of today's encryption relies, with unprecedented speed, rendering current encryption techniques vulnerable.

In response to this looming challenge, the DiCoQuaNet project was conceived with the ambitious objective of fortifying computer networks against the impending quantum threat. This collaborative effort brings together the expertise of HEIG-VD, Cysec, and Novus Q, a startup from Singapore.

Central to our endeavour was the development of a network architecture fortified against quantum attacks. Leveraging cutting-edge research in post-quantum cryptography, we engineered a quantum-resistant Virtual Private Network (VPN) infrastructure. This involved enhancing the Wireguard VPN to exclusively employ quantum-resistant technologies. Additionally, we ensured a possible integration with quantum key distribution (QKD) mechanisms, ensuring additional ways to secure the initialization of our VPN.

Beyond network fortification, we tackled the challenge of implementing threshold signature algorithms. Traditional signatures rely on a single entity possessing all necessary key material for generating signatures. In contrast, threshold signatures distribute key material among multiple stakeholders, reducing the risk of compromise. At the project's inception, existing threshold signature schemes lacked resilience against quantum attacks. Through intensive research and development efforts, we introduced the QuaRTS algorithm—a post-quantum threshold signature algorithm. This innovative algorithm not only boasts comprehensive security proofs but also features an implementation optimized for our secure, quantum-resistant network.

Moreover, our focus extended beyond theoretical advancements to practical performance optimization. By finely tuning the implementation of QuaRTS, we achieved remarkable efficiency gains, ensuring its viability in real-world scenarios.

In summary, the DiCoQuaNet project represents a pioneering effort in fortifying computer networks against the quantum threat. We obtained a performant quantum-resistant VPN solution and one of the first threshold signature algorithm that resists quantum attacks. Through collaboration, innovation, and meticulous implementation, we have laid the groundwork for a secure digital future amidst the quantum revolution.

Equipe de recherche au sein de la HES-SO: Duc Alexandre

Partenaires professionnels: Cysec, Switzerland; NovusQ, Singapore

Durée du projet: 01.04.2021 - 31.03.2024

Statut: Terminé

2021

An Area-Efficient SPHINCS+ Post-Quantum Signature Coprocessor
Article scientifique

Berthet Quentin, Upegui Posada Andres, Gantel Laurent, Duc Alexandre, Giulia Traverso

2021 IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium Workshops (IPDPSW), 2021

Lien vers la publication

2020

Learning with physical noise or errors
Article scientifique ArODES

Dina Kamel, François-Xavier Standaert, Alexandre Duc, Denis Flandre, Francesco Berti

IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing,  2020, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 957-971

Lien vers la publication

Résumé:

Hard learning problems have recently attracted significant attention within the cryptographic community, both as a versatile assumption on which to build various protocols, and as a potentially sound basis for lightweight (possibly side-channel and fault resistant) implementations. Yet, in this second case, a recurrent drawback of primitives based on the Learning Parity with Noise and Learning With Errors problems is their additional randomness requirements to generate noise or errors. In parallel, the move towards nanoscale devices renders modern implementations increasingly prone to various types of errors. As a result, inexact computing has emerged as a new paradigm to efficiently deal with the challenges raised by such erroneous computations, and mitigate the cost and power consumption overheads they cause. In this paper, we show that these cryptographic and electronic challenges can actually be turned into new opportunities, and provide an elegant solution one to the other. That is, we show that inexact implementations of inner product computations lead to a natural way to define new Learning with Physical Noise or Error assumptions, paving the way to more efficient and physically secure implementations, with potential interest for securing emerging Internet of Things applications.

A FPGA-Based Post-Processing and Validation Platform for Random Number Generators
Article scientifique

Upegui Posada Andres, Gantel Laurent, Duc Alexandre, Steiner Lucie, Vannel Fabien, Glück Florent

2020 IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium Workshops (IPDPSW), 2020

2019

Making masking security proofs concrete (or how to evaluate the security of any leaking device), extended version
Article scientifique ArODES

Alexandre Duc, Sebastian Faust, François-Xavier Standaert

Journal of Cryptology,  2019, vol. 32, pp. 1263-1297

Lien vers la publication

Résumé:

We investigate the relationship between theoretical studies of leaking cryptographic devices and concrete security evaluations with standard side-channel attacks. Our contributions are in four parts. First, we connect the formal analysis of the masking countermeasure proposed by Duc et al. (Eurocrypt 2014) with the Eurocrypt 2009 evaluation framework for side-channel key recovery attacks. In particular, we re-state their main proof for the masking countermeasure based on a mutual information metric, which is frequently used in concrete physical security evaluations. Second, we discuss the tightness of the Eurocrypt 2014 bounds based on experimental case studies. This allows us to conjecture a simplified link between the mutual information metric and the success rate of a side-channel adversary, ignoring technical parameters and proof artifacts. Third, we introduce heuristic (yet well-motivated) tools for the evaluation of the masking countermeasure when its independent leakage assumption is not perfectly fulfilled, as it is frequently encountered in practice. Thanks to these tools, we argue that masking with non-independent leakages may provide improved security levels in certain scenarios. Eventually, we consider the tradeoff between the measurement complexity and the key enumeration time complexity in divide-and-conquer side-channel attacks and show that these complexities can be lower bounded based on the mutual information metric, using simple and efficient algorithms. The combination of these observations enables significant reductions of the evaluation costs for certification bodies.

2026

SCOUT-CT: Sound Constant-Time Outcome with Uncertainty Tracking using multi-taint analysis
Conférence

Damien Maier, Jean-François Pasche, Maxim Golay, Duc Alexandre

EuroS&P 2026, 06.07.2026 - 09.07.2026, Lisbonne, Portugal

Lien vers la conférence

Résumé:

Side-channel attacks are an important class of security exploits, in which an attacker gains access to confidential data by observing information inadvertently leaked by a system. Writing constant-time code is a common defense against time-based and microarchitectural side-channel attacks.

Many approaches have been proposed to automatically verify that a program is constant-time. Sound methods can detect all information leaks, but to efficiently analyze large programs they rely on overapproximation, which can yield false alarms (i.e., reports of non-existent information leaks). Each finding produced by such an analysis therefore requires manual inspection. Additionally, most existing approaches do not perform binary-level analysis and thus miss vulnerabilities introduced by compilation.

In this paper, we present a novel sound analysis for detecting information leaks under the constant-time threat model. Compared with existing work, our technique improves taint analysis by systematically tracking precision loss to determine whether a detected information leak could be caused by overapproximation. Findings for which no precision loss is detected are guaranteed to be true and do not require manual inspection; only findings with detected precision loss need manual verification. Our analysis operates directly on binary executables. We instantiate our technique within the abstract interpretation framework and provide a proof of correctness.

We implemented our approach in a prototype tool, SCOUT-CT, and evaluated it on a benchmark of constant-time and non-constant-time programs, including real-world cryptographic implementations. Our results show that SCOUT-CT is effective at identifying true information leaks: our tool detected all 98 timing leaks in the benchmark and automatically classified 97 as true findings that do not require manual inspection.

2025

E-Laun :
Conférence ArODES
OTAR resistant to evil launchers

Alexandre Duc, Grégoire Guyot, Pascal Perrenoud

Proceedings of the 2025 Security for Space Systems (3S) conference

Lien vers la conférence

Résumé:

The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) link security depends on long-lived symmetric keys. Although the Space Data Link Security (SDLS) does support in-orbit rekeying, it does so only with symmetric techniques, i.e., by encrypting new keys under a pre-shared master key or deriving from it, leaving missions exposed should that master key be compromised. We propose two protocols called Double and Triple Diffie–Hellman (2DH/3DH) to extend SDLS with asymmetric rekeying without altering its frame format. In 2DH, the ground station sends a single ephemeral public key and derives fresh symmetric keys with the satellite’s static key, staying within minimal on-board resources. The 3DH variant lets both ends contribute with ephemeral secrets, providing perfect forward secrecy at the cost of one extra communication, an extra scalar multiplication and the need for a good entropy source on the spacecraft. Both protocols result in replay-safe, over-the-air rekeying mechanisms that fit the bandwidth and storage limits of small satellites, thereby eliminating dependence on any long-term symmetric secret. We also analyzed the implications of our protocols with respect to threats from potentially malicious launch operators, referred to as evil launchers, who might gain unauthorized access to spacecraft cryptographic key material be- fore deployment. We show how our protocols stay secure against such threats. Moreover, given the future risks posed by quantum computing, we conducted a preliminary state-of-the-art review of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms. Our analysis identified suitable PQC algorithms in such a use-case. Future work will focus on integrating these PQC algorithms within the proposed rekeying framework, preparing space communication for long-term resilience.

2021

An area-efficient SPHINCS+ post-quantum signature coprocessor
Conférence ArODES

Quentin Berthet, Andres Upegui, Laurent Gantel, Alexandre Duc

Proceedings of 2021 IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium Workshops (IPDPSW), 17-21 June 2021, Portland, OR, USA

Lien vers la conférence

Résumé:

The significant advances in the area of quantum computing of the past decade leave no doubt about the fact that quantum computers are an actual threat to cryptography. For this reason, a lot of efforts have been made lately in designing so-called post-quantum cryptographic primitives. The adoption of these schemes depends on the future capability of post-quantum cryptographic schemes to offer performances and functionalities similar to their classical counterparts. In particular, a milestone towards standardization is the implementation on FPGA of cryptographic primitives which leads to an efficient execution. We contribute in this respect by providing an area-efficient FPGA implementation of SPHINCS + , a post-quantum signature scheme which guarantees very high security, allowing its deployment into embedded systems such as hardware security modules, IoT devices or nanosatellites.

2020

A FPGA-based post-processing and validation platform for random number generators
Conférence ArODES

Laurent Gentel, Alexandre Duc, Lucie Steiner, Fabien Vannel, Andres Upegui, Florent Glück

Proceedings of 2020 IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium Workshops (IPDPSW), 18-22 May 2020, New Orleans, USA

Lien vers la conférence

Résumé:

Cryptography and computer security rely heavily on random numbers for key exchange of authentication algorithms. However, current Internet-of-Things (IoT) device security is often based on poor quality pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs). This issue can be overcome using true random number generators (TRNGs) that may offer better quality and higher security. Nonetheless, TRNG often provide slow throughput and require post-processing to correct hardware biases and ensure the desired statistical behavior. In this paper, we present a FPGA-based hardware platform able to validate and post-process multiple TRNG sources. Moreover, we propose a hardware implementation of a provably secure post-processing algorithm called SPRG. Based on the sponge construction and the Keccak-f standard, it improves random number quality while maintaining high data throughput. A full platform providing hardware acceleration has been implemented on a Xilinx Kintex- 7 FPGA board to test the validity of the generated numbers through χ 2 and SP800-90B online statistical tests, and to improve the randomness using AIS-31 or SPRG post-processing hardware cores. The proposed platform is modular and targets both IoT edge devices and back-end servers.

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